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Abstract 
The most significant value added by Euro 2012 is undoubtedly the 
infrastructural changes. The event became a catalyst for the execution of more 
than two hundred projects for an amount of ca. PLN 100 billion. This paper 
focuses on the key projects, including above all the road construction projects, 
as well as those connected to road and rail infrastructure. 
Considering such significant outlays, the funding the preparation, 
particularly in a division into private and public sources, becomes an especially 
important issue. It is the predominant commitment of public funds that creates 
the need to justify their allocation, chiefly in the case of the sports venues, 
usually utilised by private sports clubs after the end of the event. Euro 2012 has 
been compared in this respect with other events of this rank, staged in Europe 
since the beginning of the 21st century. 
 
Introduction 
The most significant value added by Euro 2012 is undoubtedly the 
infrastructural changes. The event became a catalyst for the execution of more 
than two hundred projects for an amount of ca. PLN 100 billion. This paper 
focuses on the key projects, including above all the road construction projects, 
as well as those connected to road and rail infrastructure. 
Considering such significant outlays, the funding the preparation, 
particularly in a division into private and public sources, becomes an especially 
important issue. It is the predominant commitment of public funds that creates 
the need to justify their allocation, chiefly in the case of the sports venues, usually 
utilised by private sports clubs after the end of the event. Euro 2012 has been 
compared in this respect with other events of this rank, staged in Europe since the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
 
Euro 2012 as the greatest mega event ever in Poland 
 
The fact of entrusting organisation of one of the world’s largest sport events 
to Poland gave rise to the natural questions as to whether our country would be 
ready to take up such a multifront challenge. Particular anxiety accompanied the 
condition of the infrastructure and the scale of the necessary actions to improve 
it. The only elements which appeared to be of decent quality were: the hotel 
infrastructure, the quantitative coverage of the Polish railway network, and the 
urban transport. All other areas required immense investments almost 
revolutionary in nature. Some economists formulated a risky, though not 
unsubstantiated thesis, that given its actual infrastructure of the year 2007 
Poland would not have stood any chance organise the Euro efficiently even as 
early as in 1980 [Zawadzki, 2013b, p. 53].  
Hence, the paramount challenge the organisers faced was to carry out the 
necessary infrastructural projects. As mentioned in the subchapter 1.3, the 
number of the investments planned totalled 219. The immense scale of the 
investment-related works was evident to the legislator as early as at the stage of 
creating the legal framework, and the scenario of a possible failure to carry 
through the daring plans was realised. Therefore, the projects were arranged in 
three groups depending on their perceived weight. The key investments grouped 
the initiatives considered paramount in importance and indispensible for 
efficient organisation of the Euro 2012. This group includes projects connected 
with: 
 stadiums, 
 road infrastructure, 
 air transport, 
 rail transport, 
 public transport. 
Among the important projects were also those connected with medical care, 
while other projects also included hotel infrastructure and the preparation of 
team base camps. 
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the projects grouped by their designations. 
Apart from the four host cities, the projects embraced the entire country. This 
means, they were investments carried out over large areas, basically improving 
the transport infrastructure all over Poland. The largest group named “other 
cities” refers primarily to the accommodation centres dispersed all over the 
country, prepared to receive the national teams. Table 3.3 reveals that out of the 
four host cities Wrocław was the location of most key and important projects 
planned. However, with all other investments taken into account Gdańsk takes 
the lead with its 34 projects in total. 
  
 Table 3.  
Number of projects implemented in preparation for the Euro 2012 in Poland,  
grouped by area  
 
Area 
Project type 
Total 
Key Important Other 
Gdańsk   7   5   22   34 
Poznań   5 11   13   29 
Warsaw   4   7     8   19 
Wrocław 11   6   11   28 
Other cities   0   0   69   69 
Poland 19   8   13   40 
Total 46 37 136 219 
 
Source: the author’s own study.  
As of day one, it was assumed that the percent of unrealised projects would 
be inversely proportional to the weight ascribed to them. In practice, it turned 
out that not only some of the ‘other’ projects, but also not all of the undertaken 
investments of the ‘key’ and ‘important’ status had been completed by the 
opening of the European Championship. Table 3.4 shows the degree of project`s 
attainment expressed in figures and percentages. The category of investments 
unfinished on time includes projects ultimately completed by the end of the year 
2012. There were 13 projects brought to completion after their original deadline, 
including 2 of the key status, and 6 classified as important. In table 3.4, the 
number of those investments is shown in brackets.  
 
Table 4.  
Degree of project attainment by day one of the Euro 2012 
 
Area 
Project type 
Key Important Other 
Total 
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Gdańsk   6 1 86% 4 1 80% 15 7 (1) 68% 74% 
Poznań   4 1 80% 6 5 (1) 55%   9 4 (2) 69% 66% 
Warsaw   3 1 75% 6 1 (1) 86%   3 5 38% 63% 
Wrocław 10 1 91% 5 1 83%   4   36% 68% 
Other cities - - - - - - 32 37 (1) 46% 46% 
Poland  12 7 (2) 63% 3 5 (4) 38%  7 6 (1) 54% 55% 
Total 35 11 (2) 76% 24 13 (6) 65% 70 66 (5) 51% 59% 
 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
On the whole, however, the anticipation that the degree of project attainment 
would be proportional to the status ascribed to the specific projects has proven 
true. We have managed to complete more than ¾ of the planned key projects, 
but not much more than half of all other initiatives. Ultimately, 59 per cent of 
the planned projects were completed on time. Looking at the host cities alone, 
Gdańsk performed best with 74 per cent of its planned initiatives completed 
before day one of the Euro event. On the other hand, from the perspective of the 
key and important projects alone, Wrocław proved more effective with its 
respective 91 and 83 per cent plan attainment. 
Figure 2. The degree of attainment of individual projects related to the Euro 2012 by 
the type of the infrastructural investment 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
When analysing the degree of project attainment against the criterion of the 
type of the infrastructural one should note cases of 100 per cent plan execution 
in the categories of key and important projects. These are found in such areas as 
stadium infrastructure, air transport, urban transport, and projects connected 
with medical care and safety. Moreover, the degree of advancement into key and 
important projects, if only undertaken, never fell below 55 per cent. The top 
position in this ranking belongs to the air transport-related infrastructure, where 
the key and important projects were fully completed. The outcomes were worst, 
as could be expected, in the case of other projects. In none of the analysed areas 
was the plan fully executed, and the worst situation was noted for the railway 
infrastructure, where the attainment stopped at the mere 14 per cent (Figure 3.2).  
 
Final remarks 
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In this study, an attempt was made to estimate the impact of the organisation 
of UEFA European Championships on the host cities: Gdańsk, Poznań, Warsaw 
and Wrocław. The adopted list of infrastructural undertakings executed as part 
of Euro 2012 preparations included 219 projects divided according to the 
urgency criterion into key, important and other projects. Analysis of project 
completion revealed that not all tasks had been executed as planned before the 
beginning of the event. Predictably, the key projects were found to have been 
completed in the greatest percentage of the cases (76%), while other projects 
were characterised by the lowest percentage of completion (51%). The degree of 
completion also varied between the individual cities. Gdańsk turned out to be 
the most efficient city with 74% of all projects completed, while Warsaw was at 
the bottom of the ranking with 63% of completed projects.  
Even considering the high percentage of incomplete infrastructural projects, 
it is worth emphasising that Euro 2012 became a catalyst of important changes, 
especially with respect to broadly defined transport infrastructure. It is 
particularly striking in the case of road infrastructure. In 2012 alone 953 
kilometres of expressways were completed. For comparison, by 2011 only 
slightly over 1700 kilometres of such roads had been built. What is important, 
the effects of Euro 2012 will still be noticeable at least until the end of 2014, 
when all projects undertaken in connection with the event will have been 
completed. 
Such considerable infrastructural needs of Poland necessitated massive 
outlays. Euro 2012 proved to be the most expensive of the UEFA European 
Championships organised in the 21st century and, in all likelihood, in the whole 
history of the tournament. A highly disadvantageous fact for our country was the 
complete absence of commitment of private funds in the financing of the 
preparations. The public-private partnership program, in which high hopes had 
been placed in connection with the organisation of Euro 2012, turned out to be a 
total failure. It is noteworthy that it is an unprecedented case of financing a 
sporting event of this type exclusively from public sources. 
The most frequently recognised legacy of the Championships are the 
stadiums. The future management of these venues will have an influence on the 
general cost-benefit ratio of their construction/extension. The difficulties in 
generating sufficient revenues to cover the costs of maintenance and debt 
service are already being experienced. The study indicated some feasible ways 
of fund acquisition involving the organisation of both sporting and non-sporting 
events. 
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